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A new psychophysical study has examined the free
flow of perception as observers viewed stimuli with
several possible visual interpretations. The results
suggest that our subjective impression of such
ambiguous patterns may be more closely linked to
the brain’s encoding of complex shape than
previously appreciated.
It is interesting to consider that the first thinkers who
pondered visual perception were inclined to imagine
the eye as an active organ, shooting out streams of
light at the surroundings to ‘feel’ the structure of
objects and scenes. This emanation theory of sight
was not a fringe belief held only by mystics, but was
the accepted view among such great minds as Plato,
Euclid and Ptolemy [1]. In contrast, modern theories of
vision begin with an image of the world, cast
innocently and passively onto the back of the eye. This
image ceases to be an impartial physical entity only
through its reception by the retina and brain, which
perform a rigorous analysis aimed at understanding
the structure and arrangement of objects from which
the light pattern originated.
In the past few decades, microelectrode recordings
in monkeys have provided great insight into this
analytic aspect of vision [2]. The secret appears to lie
in a highly organized neural network of explicit stimu-
lus representations, acting first to dissect a visual
scene into its most basic attributes, and later recon-
stituting it as understandable objects and forms. A
prominent part in the initial dissection is played by the
primary visual cortex, a large area replete with
neurons responding to specific visual ‘primitives’ in
the image, such as spatially localized edges or color
patches. Higher-order representations, thought to
derive from combinations of such primitives, are found
at later cortical processing stages such as the infero-
temporal cortex, where individual cells respond to
geometrical shapes, objects, and even faces [3–6].
The visual cortex, as a whole, thus imposes an
elaborate and massively parallel analysis upon the
light image striking the retina, simultaneously encod-
ing a diversity of low-level and high-level image
features. It may be slightly alarming to consider that
much of this sensory machinery can perform its task,
at least to a first approximation, even when an animal
is under general anesthesia. But, while the ultimate
link with perception remains poorly understood, this
analytic aspect of vision is generally taken to be the
core of the brain’s approach to the problem of vision,
allowing us to decode, understand, and ultimately
interact with the visual surroundings.
But is it really possible that our visual perception
of the world derives from an automatic and largely
passive re-representation of the retinal image?
Clearly, the ancients understood that vision consists
of ‘looking’ in addition to ‘seeing’ — we do not
simply sense our surroundings, but are actively
engaged in them. Our brain is able to orient to par-
ticular elements of a scene, ignore others, and gen-
erate hypotheses about the structure of objects
based on imperfect or incomplete data [7]. For some
patterns that are inherently ambiguous, such active
elements of perception are revealed through the
brain’s continual exploration of alternative visual
solutions. Typically, such patterns are ‘bistable’,
offering exactly two percepts that alternate every few
seconds in their dominance. They are often used to
illustrate the interpretive nature of perception, as
they provide the brain with freedom to ‘organize’ its
input in accordance with structural properties of the
stimulus [8], as well cognitive factors such as atten-
tion [9] or prior experience [10]. In modern-day
speak, mechanisms that aide or guide perceptual
organization with these or any stimuli are labeled
‘top-down’ effects — a term so often used for such a
wide range of phenomena that it has virtually no
explanatory power. A great challenge for vision sci-
entists is to gain a more refined notion of how basic
feature representations in the visual cortex interact
with loftier parts of the brain involved in attention,
abstraction, memory and decision-making.
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Figure 1. Example of stimulus used in the perceptual trapping
experiment.
If the two patterns in (A) are presented stereoscopically to the
two eyes, perception fluctuates between four possible coher-
ent percepts (B). However the probability of seeing a particular
stimulus at each point in time is not random, but instead highly
dependent on the previous perceptual state.
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A recent study by Suzuki and Grabowecky [11] may
shed some new light on this difficult question. They
explored how visual perception, when faced with an
unusually ambiguous problem, ultimately settles upon
an answer. Specifically, they developed a novel family
of multistable patterns that, when viewed stereoscop-
ically, each gave rise to four distinct shapes (Figure 1).
A key to this study was the multiplicity of solutions,
which allowed the authors to explore not only the
timing of perceptual reversals, but also ‘where’ per-
ception went at each point in time. Interestingly, they
found that it did not jump randomly between all solu-
tions, which might be expected given that each solu-
tion was seen, on average, for roughly equal amounts
of time. Instead, perception tended to become
‘trapped’ between particular pairs of shapes. 
With the stimulus in Figure 1, for instance, percep-
tion was much more likely to fluctuate between
shapes 1 and 3, or 2 and 4, than any of the other com-
binations (Figure 2). This favoring of particular transi-
tions, or path dependence as Suzuki and Grabowecky
[11] call it, adds a new dimension to the investigation
of multistable perception, and has potentially impor-
tant implications for natural vision as well. Why might
the brain, faced with several equally valid solutions to
a visual problem, pursue certain paths through an
abstract ‘shape-space’ at the expense of others?
To get at this point, Suzuki and Grabowecky [11]
drew upon previous results that explored the neural
encoding of global shape using a novel aftereffect
[12,13]. In those studies, Suzuki and colleagues used
the psychophysical technique of adaptation to provide
evidence that basic shapes may be represented in a
reciprocal or ‘opponent’ manner in the visual system.
Opponent encoding schemes are common in vision.
They are known to underlie the analysis of first-order
stimulus attributes such as luminance and color [14],
and recent evidence suggests that they may play a
role in the representation of much higher stimulus
attributes as well [15]. For geometrical patterns, oppo-
nent principles could aide greatly in the analysis of
global shape attributes such as convexity or asymme-
try, as they offer a number of computational advan-
tages over classic ‘feature detectors’ that simply
report a presence or absence of a particular shape.
Interestingly, Suzuki and Grabowecky [11] discovered
that the trapping of perception occurred primarily
between shapes that had been previously identified as
opponent pairs. This subtle point is critical to
understanding the implications of their results, as it
provides a direct link between the observers’ subjec-
tive experience and the neural representations in the
visual cortex.
Perceptual trapping demonstrates that even when
the brain is given great freedom to interpret its sensory
inputs, it does not wander randomly through solutions,
nor does it seek them based upon abstract or seman-
tic properties of stimuli. Instead, it appears to be
bound by principles stemming directly from the under-
lying neural encoding scheme — in this case the oppo-
nent coding of global shape. As usual, the ultimate
interpretation of these observations depends upon
existing preconceptions. Opinions regarding the nature
of perceptual multistability remain diverse [16–20], and
those who take it to be fundamentally a manifestation
of instability in the sensory domain will likely embrace
these findings as further evidence for that viewpoint.
Yet, it may be of great value to consider these results
not only in terms of local coding, but also with regard
to interactions between brain areas. 
Much evidence suggests that the resolution of
sensory ambiguity is aided or even steered by high-
level, executive centers in a kind of perceptual ‘explo-
ration’ [18]. From this vantage point, the present
findings might give new insight into the level of visual
processing at which such external signals intervene.
One of many possibilities is that higher centers com-
municate directly and specifically with shape-selective
neurons in areas like the inferotemporal cortex,
prompting them to issue a general ‘reevaluation’ of the
sensory input that, in turn, might affect many levels of
visual representation.
Regardless of which areas may be responsible for
initiating and/or interpreting the perceptual changes,
these findings make the important new point that the
course of subjective perception, even when given the
possibility to wander freely between equally valid
interpretations of a stimulus, is bound to the basic
principles of sensory encoding in the visual cortex.
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Figure 2. Example of perceptual trapping with the stimulus
shown in Figure 1.
The percept of a subject is shown to alternate as a function of
time (despite the unchanging visual stimulus). While each of the
four visual solutions commonly reaches perceptual dominance,
the majority of subjective transitions are between opponent
shape pairs, and perception is thus ‘trapped’ (red and green
highlighted regions).
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